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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, a formal model has been developed to analyze the appointment 
of individuals to serve as central bank govemoI's in a two-party palitieal system 
when confinnation hearings exist and monetary policy is determined according 
to a majority-rule voting system. lile major results of the paper are tbat 
appointed governors will tend to be more moderate (i) if the nominating party 
and the confmning party do not coincide, (H) the lower the chance the 
nominating party and the confrrming party coincide in the future, (in) if the 
term governors must serve out overlaps an electian, (iv) as the next election 
approaches, and (v) the lower the probability the nominating party wins the 
next election. Sorne of these theoretical results are consistent with existing 
empírical evidence related to tbe Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo para analizar el nombramiento de 
individuos como miembros del consejo del banco central en un sistema poJítico 
bipartidista cuando dichos miembros deben ser confmnados por el Parlamento 
y la política monetaria se determina mediante la regla de la mayoría en el 
consejo del banco central. El principal resultado obtenido es que los 
gobernadores nombrados tenderán a ser más moderados (i) si el partido 
nominador y el confmnador son diferentes, (ii) cuanto menor sea la 
probabilidad de que ambos partidos coincidan en el futuro, (iii) si el mandato 
que debe servir un gobernador se solapa con una elección, (iv) a medida que 
la próxima elección se acerca, y (v) cuanto menor sea la probabilidad de que 
el partido hoy en el gobierno gane la próxima elección, Varios de estos 
resultados teóricos son consistentes con la evidencia empírica existente para el 
Consejo de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva Federal. 
*Research facilities provided by CEMFI are gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Introduction 
Recent research indicates that partisan pressures have considerable influence 
on monetary policy. The main channels through which partisan influences can be 
transmitted to the central bank are direct signalling of desired monetary 
pOlicies (Havrilesky, 1988, 1991), coercion and bashing (Waller, 1991) and 
central bank appointments (Havrilesky and Schweitzer, 1990; Gildea, 1990; 
Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992). From an ernpirical point of view, Chappell, 
Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) conclude that in the U.S. case partisanship in 
the appointment process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences 
in desired monetary policies arise. 
Since in practlce the appointment process is structured in a way such that 
central bank governors wi 11 always be appointed through a poli tical process, 
it is important to know how particUlar institucional structures affect the 
composition of the central bank board and, in turn, monetary policy. 
Previous work by Garcia de Paso (1993) shows that in a model where 
confirmation hearings do not exist, monetary policy uncertainty ls affected by 
several institUcional features. In particular, the lengthening of governors' 
terrns in off ice reduces monetary policy uncertainty and the membership of 
administration officials on the central bank board increases monetary policy 
uncertainty. 
However, if confirmation hearings do exist (as it is in the U.S.) and the out-
of -power party currently has or may have in the future a majori ty in the 
legislative body which must confirm nominated governors, this party will have 
sorne influence over the appointment of central bankers. Therefore, it 5eems 
that a formal model of the appointment process in the presence of confirmation 
hearings is required as a further step towards a positive theory of rnonetary 
institutions. 
Waller (1992) has developed such a model under the assumption that the utility 
a party obtains from an additional central banker on the board i5 independent 
of the previous composi tion of the board and that the total utili ty a party 
obtains from all the board members is the sum of the.individual utilities. 
However, monetary policy is tipically determined according to a majority-rule 
voting system and Waller' s model does not account for this fact. Thus, the 
purpo5e of this paper is to construct a rnodel which explicitly accounts for 
the majority-rule voting system at central banks in order to study the effects 
of several institutional features when confirmation hearings are presento 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic institutional 
structure. Section 3 develops the appointment game for a case where governors' 
nominating and confirming parties never coincide. Section 4 extends the game 
for a case where nominating and confirming parties may or may not coincide, as 
it is in practice. Subsection 4.1. centers upon a case where the appointed 
governor must serve out a term which does not overlap an election. Subsection 
4.2. analyzes the case where the term overlaps an election. Section 5 
diScUS5es the results obtained in the light of previous empirical evidence on 
the subject. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
The key results obtained are the following: 
-if the confirming party is always different from the nominating party, the 
appointed governor will be of a type such that the expected utility both 
parties obtain from his appointment is zero. 
-if there exists a chance that the nominating and the confirming party 
coincide and the term to be served out does not overlap an election, the 
appointed governor will be more partisan {U the more patient parties are, 
(ii) the shorter the term which must be served out, and (iii) the higher the 
chance the nominating party and the confirming party coincide. 
-appointed governors wil1 tend to be 1ess partisan (i) if the term they must 
serve out overlaps an election, (iU as the next election approaches, and 
(iii) the 10wer the probability the nominating party wins the next election. 
2. The basie institutional strueture 
Our economy is characterized by a two-party system, consisting of party 1 and 
party O. Moreover, there exists a government that carries out certain 
administrative and legislative duties. The branch of government that performs 
administrative duties will be referred to as the executive body. Ihe branch of 
government that carries out legislative duties will be referred to as the 
legislative body. 
The two parties compete electorally for tbe executive body. An election is 
held every n periods of time. For instance, if at the beginning of period t an 
election takes place, the next election will take place at the beginning of 
period t+n. 
Monetary policy is conducted by a group of central bankers who compose the 
central bank board. Ihere are r seats on the central bank board and each seat 
carries with it a term of r periods of time. These r terms are staggered so 
that they overlap each other by one periodo Then, in our model a term expires 
at the start of every periodo 
Ihe victor of the last election is allowed to nominate candidates to serve as 
central bankers but these candidates must be confirmed by the legislative 
body. Therefore, there exists a confirmation process through which prospective 
central bankers must go, whereby the majority party at the legislative bedy 
can veto a nominee if it desires to do so. 
As a consequence, at the start of every period the governmental party 
nomina tes a candidate to fi11 the seat that becomes vacant. If the candidate 
is vetoed, the party in power nomina tes a new candidate at the start of the 
next periodo If this new nominee is rejected such a nomination-veto process 
keeps repeating litself every period until a nominee is accepted by the 
legislative body;t? 
,,j 
The legislative body can be controlled by either of the two parties. Since the 
party that controls the legislative body must confirm the nominees, this party 
will be referred to as the confirming party. As a consequence, the nominating 
party and the confirming party may or may not coincide. 
If a central banker ls appointed and confirmed in the first period of a term, 
he will serve r periods. However, a seat can become vacant before lts term 
expires because of a resignation or death. In such a cas~, a sucessor central 
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bank:er serves out the remainder of the term to preserve the overlapping 
structure of the board. The sucessor must go through a new confirmatlon 
process and if confirmed he will serve 1 ~ s < r perlods. 
The central bank board conducts monetary policy through controlling a monetary 
instrument denoted by y. Party 1 and party O differ in thelr most preferred 
value of such a monetary instrumento Party l's most preferred values ls y1 ~ 
1, whereas party O's most preferred value is yO ~ O. Each prospective central 
banker has al so a monetary instrument bliss point. He will assume that the 
range of central bank candidates' bliss points is the closed unit interval: y 
E [0,11. A candidate will be referred to as being of type y if his monetary 
instrument bliss point ls y. 
Within the central bank board monetary policy will be determined according to 
a majority-rule voting system. As a result, the monetary policy actually 
implemented wlll be the value of the monetary instrument preferred by the 
median governor on the board, denoted by y and there will be no incentive for 
a governor to misrepresent his true bliss point. 
Every period t, each party obtains utility from the monetary pollcy actually 
implemented in that period (Yt). Iherefore, a party obtains utility from the 
board of governors as a whole in the following manner: 
(la) 
(lb) Yt 
where the subscripts O and 1 denote parties O and 1, respectively. 
Equatlons (la) and (lb) show that each party's most preferred monetary policy 
is the least preferred monetary policy by the other party. 
Since the board consists of r central bankers and parties obtain utility from 
the median governor on the board, the utility that a party obtains from an 
individual central banker depends on the other central bankers' types. 
tet Yt denote tha type of a candidate nominated at the start of perlad t. 
Moreover, let y~!~)denote the median central banker on the board in period t+i 
if Yt was appointed at the start of period t and Y~!~) denote the median 
central banker on the board in period t+i if Yt was not appointed at the start 
of perlod t. Thus, y~!~) and Y~!i) differ because of the presence of a type Yt 
central banker on the board at time t+i to conform the median member Y~!i) . 
Let u{Yt)z t+i denote the utility a party z (~O,l) obtains in period t+i from 
a candidat~ of type Yt. Such a utility is given by the difference between the 
utility the party obtains from the board in period t+i if the candidate was 
appointed and the utili ty the party obtains from the board in period t+i if 
the candidate was not appointed: 
(2a) 
3 
[2b) 
Susti tuting equation (la) into (2a) and [lb) iuto (2b) w. obtaln: 
(3a) u(Yt1o,l+i l1 - y~!;) ) - l1 - y~!;» -sIl) -c{l) = YtH 
- Yl+i 
[3b) U(Yt)l,l+i = 
-c(l) 
-s(l) 
Yt+i - Yt+1 
Equations (3a) and (3b) reveal that u{Yt10,t+l = - U(Yt)l,t+I' that ls, ir a 
party obtains a utility gain from a candidate, the ather party obtalns a 
utility 10ss of the same arder of magnitude so that tbe nomination-
confirmation process can be considered as a zwro-sum game. This result follows 
from the fact that parties obtain utility from a majority-rule based monetary 
peliey. 
In particular, this fact implies that the value of an additional central 
banker for a party will depend on the relative strengths of voting bloes 
existing on the board for the entire term a central banker is appointed foro 
Moreover, pivotal appointments to the board will not have the same value for a 
party as any other appointment because a pivotal appointment will change the 
median member of the board and, in turn, the monetary policy actually 
lmplemented. 
Let "'t denote a vacancy that it is not filled in perlod t. In this case, Yt == 
0 t • Then, it happens that y~!~) '" y~!~) because the seat was not filled. As a 
consequence, the utility that parties obtain in period t+i if the vacant was 
not filled in period tare the following: 
(4a) 
[4b) 
~,,(t) ~,,(t) 
Yt+i - Yt+i o 
Equations (4a) and (4b) show that if a vacant is not filled in period t, both 
parties experiment neither El utility ga.in nor a utility loss. The reason being 
that if the vacant seat is not filled, the median central banker on the board 
and, in turn, the monetary policy actually implemented does not change. Since 
monetary policy remains the same, parties do not experiment a utility change. 
In the case the nominating party obtains the same utility from nominating a 
candidate than from not filling the vacancy, we will assume that the candidate 
is nominated. Sim~larly, if the confirming party obtains the same utility from 
accepting a can~idate than from rejecting it, we will assume that the 
candidate will be:'; accepted. 
4 
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3. The appointment game when nominating and confirming parties never coincide 
In this case a party controls the executive body and the other party controls 
the legislative body. Since the confirming party at any time t can veto a 
nominee, this confirming party has a strong bargaining power over current 
appointments. Al though a central bank can be contemplated as an ongoing 
organization (Cothren, 1988), the fact that a seat carries with it a finite 
term (r periods of time, where r < 00) turns the appointment process into a 
bargaining game over payoffs (utilities) that the parties receive over a 
finite time intervalo 
Therefore, we have a finite horizon alternating offer bargaining model, where 
there is a positive probability that the roles of nominating and cOnfirming 
parties will be rever8ed during the game. Since the horizon i8 finite the 
solution to our game will be obtained by backwards induction. 
Let k denote the nominating party (the governmental party) and j denote the 
confirming party, with )=0,1 and k=l~j. This assumption (only for section 3) 
implies that the opposition party always controls the legislative body which 
must confirm the candidates. Every period t a term expires and this vacancy 
must be filled. The new seat on the board to be filled carries with it a term 
of r = s periods of time, where s denotes the number of periods remaining in a 
term if a vacancy arises within it. 
Moreover, every period t more vacancies can arise if one or more governors 
quit the board before their terms expire. In such cases, these seats have s 
periods remaining in the current term, with 1 ~ s < r. 
For each vacancy to be filled at the start of period t, party k nomlnates a 
candidate of type Yt that it finds suitable to fill a seat on the board. After 
that, party j decides to confirm or veto the nominee. 
If party k candidate i8 accepted, he serves out s periods. If party k 
candidate is vetoed, the vacancy i8 not filled during period t and a new 
candidate will be nominated in period t+1 by the then nominating party. 
At the start of period t, party k faces the following problem: ei ther nominate 
a candidate at time t (and obtain from him an expected utili ty in the s 
following periods) or not nominate a candidate (and wait for a more suitable 
nomination next period). 
The decision that party ) faces at the start of period t if a nomination is 
made by party k is the following: either accept the nominee (and obtain from 
him an expected utili ty in the s following periods) or reject him (and wai t 
for a more suitable candidate next perlod). 
Let Yt denote the acceptable candidate in period t by both parties. Acceptable 
period t candidates (Yt Yt ) must satisfy the following condition: 
s 
where Et is the expectation given time t information, ó is tbe common discount 
factor for both parties, Yt+1 is an acceptable candidate for both parties in 
period t+l, and 1 ~ s ~ r. 
Ihe candidates that jointly satisfy equation (5) for z=O and z=l are the types 
of candidates that will be botb nominated and confirmed. 
From equations (4a) and (4b), we have 
(6) z = 0,1 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5), we obtain 
0,1 
Ye can rewrite (7) as (Sa) and (8b): 
{Sal E,{ L-' , i=O ó u(Yt)o, t+i } > { r-' Et 1=1 0 1 u(Yt +1)0 t+i } 
(8b) Et{ L:~ oi U(Yt}l,t+i } > {L-' , Et =1 o u(Yt.+l)1,t+i } 
From equations (3a) and (3b) we know that u(Yt)O,t+1 
equation in (Sa), we can write 
-U(Yt)1,t+l' Using this 
(9a) E,{ ["-' , 1=0 <3 u(Yt )1,t+i } > { r-' - Et 1=1 ,,' U(YU1)1,t+i } 
(9b) E,{ L:~ ó i u(Yt )l,t+i } > E,{ ["-' , } 1=1 o U(Yt +1)1,t+i 
Equations (9a) and (9b) jointly hold if and only if 
(lOa) 
(lOb) 
We can jointly write (lOa) and (10b) as equation (11): 
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.... 
(11) 
Since equation (11) applies for 1 :s s :s r, we can solve for the equilibrium 
appointments by working backwards. 
For s = 1, equation (11) reads 
(12) { r'-' Et Li=O 
Rearranging (12) we obtain 
(13a) 
0, z = 0,1 
0, z = 0,1 
When s = 1, we are considering a vacancy that arises in a seat whose term 
expires at the end of period t. If party k nominates and party j confirms a 
candidate of type Yt , they obtain in period t an expected utility given by 
Et{u(Yt)z,t}. Moreover, since at the beginning of period t it is known who the 
median governor on the board was before the vacancy is filled and who the 
median governor will be if a candidate of type Yt is appointed to the board, 
we can write 
(13b) z = 0,1 
However, if party k does not nominate a candidate to fill the vacancy or party 
j vetoes the nominee, tbe seat remains vacant in period t and a new term 
begins for the vacant seat at the start of period t+l. As a consequence, the 
expected payoff a party obtains if it waits for a more suitable candidate next 
period is zero because there is no next period within the current termo This 
fact is reflected in the right-hand-side of equation C13a). 
The idea is tbat if a seat becomes vacant in the last period of its respective 
term, parties may extract utility by filling the vacancy with a candidate that 
serves out this last periodo Once the vacancy has emerged there will be a 
median governor on tbe board (the incumbent median governor). Suppose party k 
nomina tes a candidate. If this candidate is appointed. the new median governor 
on the board will be different from the incumbent median governor. Obviously, 
party k will not nominate a candidate such that -if appointed- the new median 
governor will be further from its monetary instrument bliss point than the 
incumhent median governor actually is. However, the same strategy will be 
followed by party j in deciding whether or not to accept the nominee. 
As a result, the only acceptable candidate for both parties will be of a type 
Yt such that both parties obtain zero utility from that candidate. Therefore. 
the appointment of tbis candidate will not change the median governor on the 
board. This result can be seen by substituting equations (3a) and (3b) into 
eqUation (13b): 
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(14a) 
° 
(14b) (y ) Y-Ot(tl _ -yOt ") u t 1, t "" 
° 
For equations (14a) and (14b) to hold, it is necessary that y~(t):= y~(t) 
Suppose now that a vacancy arises in the seat considered aboye (the one whose 
term expires at the end of period t) at the beginning of period t-l. Then, 
this seat has s = 2 periods remaining in the current term. 
Lagging equation (11) and using it for s = 2, we have 
z "'" 0,1 
Manipulating this express ion, ane obtains 
116) z 0,1 
Since we have already obtained that Et{u(Yt)z,t} = u(Yt)z,t = O, it is clear 
that at the start of period t-l both parties expect that no utility gain will 
be obtained if they wait for an acceptable candidate until the beginning of 
period t. As a consequence, we can write 
(17) z "" 0,1 
Sustituting equation (17) into the right-hand-side of equatian (16), one 
obtains 
(18) z = 0,1 
Equation (18) reveals that the only acceptable candidate to fil! a vacancy 
with s "" 2 remaining periads must be of a type such that the expected 
discounted utility}hat both parties extract from his appointment during the s 
= 2 remaining periffids is zero. 
;j 
Imagine that at tht beginning of period t-2 a vacancy arises in the seat whose 
term expires at the end of period t. Therefore, the current term has s = 3 
remaining periods. 
USing equation (11) for s 3, we have 
8 
H 
119) Et_2{ L~=o Qi U(Yt _2)z,t_2+1 } = Et_2{ L~"'l 13 1 u(Yt -1)z,t-2+i }, z 
Manipulating equatlon (19) one obtains 
(20) Et_2{ u(Yt - 2)z,t-2 + Qu(Yt _2L¡o;,t_l + Q2U(Yt _2}z,t } = 
O'Et_2{ u(Yt-l)z,t-l + oU(Yt _1 )z,t }, z = 0,1 
0,1 
Since from equation 
provide zero expected 
write 
(18) we know that an acceptable cantidate Yt -1 will 
dlscounted utllity galn durlng periods t-l and t, we can 
(21) z 0,1 
Substituting equation (21) into the right-hand-side of equation (20), 
obtains 
(22) z "" 0,1 
Repeating this sequence of substitutions until s = r, we have 
(23) 
Equation (23) can be rewritten as 
(24) 
{ 
\,,-1 1-1 QEt_r+l Li=l 13 
Since, by backwards induction, it is known that 
(25) 
substituting equation (2S) into equation (24) yields 
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z = 0,1 
z 0,1 
0,1 
one 
(26) 0, z 0,1 
Updating equation (26) r-l periods yields 
(27) Et{ L::~ oiU{Yt)z,t+i } = O, z = 0,1 
Equation (27) provides the two conditions for a candidate to be both nomlnated 
and confirmed al the start of time t to [111 a vacancy arising in the first 
perlad of the term (s = r). However, through the sequence of backwards 
induction we have found that similar conditions do exlst for acceptable 
candidates to [il1 vacancles arising in the second, third, ... periods of the 
term (1 ~ s ~ r). Therefore, equation (28) nests all those conditions: 
(28) z = 0,1, (1 :;; s ::; r) 
Equation (28) establishes that if a party always has the right to veto a 
candidate from the ather party, the acceptable candidate will be of a type so 
that the expected discounted utility both parties receive during the remainder 
of his term is zero. 
The reason is clear. Since the utility gain a party receives from an 
appointment is exactly the utility loss the other party obtains, the 
confirming party will never confirm a candidate that provides it an expected 
utility loss. Similarly, the nominating party will never nominate a candidate 
that provide8 it an expected utility 10s8. Then, the only acceptable candidate 
will be of a type such that both parties obtain neither an expected utility 
105S nor an expected utility gain. 
4. The appointment game when nominating and confirming parties may coincide 
Now, we consider the case where, as it is in practice, the same party may 
control both the executive and the legislative branches of government. 
!L...L.. Appointments for terms that do not overlap elections 
Recall that elections take place every n periods. Let P the probability that 
the victor of the last election (party k) wins the next election, with l-P 
being the probability that the losing party of the last election (party j) 
wins the next election. 
;~ 
Let H denote the.;,probability that every period of time the losing party of the 
previous election has the power to confirm or reject the nominees (that is, 
the opposition party may or may not control the legislative bodyJ1. In this 
case, k ~ j if the opposition party does not control the legislative body and 
k * j if the opposition party control s the legislative body and must confirm 
, 
lThis assumption implies that every period there exists an election for the 
legislative body different from the election for the executive body (the 
latter being held every n periods). 
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the nominees. 
In order to simplify the solution to the model we as sume that both P and H are 
exogeneously determined and time-stationary. Moreover, assume that the events 
"party X is e1ected for the executive body" (X~O,l) and "the non-elec'ted_ party 
T has veto power at the legislative body" (T=O,l) are independent. 
Let Y~ denote an acceptable candidate in period t for both parties ir the 
losing party has veto power. Similarly, let ~ denote an acceptable candidate 
in period t for both parties if the losing party has no veto power. 
In the case the l05ing party has veto power in period t, from equation (11) we 
know that acceptable candidates (Yt ~ Y~) must satisfy the following condition 
(29) 0,1 
where Yt+l '" Y~+l if the losing party has veto power in periad t+l and Yt+l 
~+1 if the losing party has no veto power in period t+l. 
In the case the !osing party has no veto power in period t, acceptable perlad 
t candidates (Yt '" ~) must satisfy: 
(30) Et{ L::~ oi U(~)k,t+i } ~ Et{ L~:~ 0 1 U(Yt+l)k,t+i } 
where k=O,l denotes the nominating party (that is, the victor of the last 
election) . 
Assume that at the start of periad t a vacancy arises in a seat whose term 
expires at the end of periad t. Periad t is not an electoral periodo In period 
t the losing party either may have veto right (with probability H) ar may not 
have veta right (with probability 1-H). 
If there exists veto right and 5ince s~l, the condition for an acceptable 
period t candidate reads: 
(31a) 
If there is no veta power, sllch a condition reads: 
(31b) 
Obviously, if the out-of-power party has not a say in the selection process 
the nominating party will nominate (and, in turn, will appoint) a central 
banker ~ that maximizes the party's utility. As a result, this candidate will 
tend to be more partisan (less moderate) than a candidate that must pass 
thraugh confirmation hearings. 
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Now, by making use of the law of iterated expectations, we can obtain the 
utility that at the beginning of period t-l the nominating party k expects to 
obtain in period t from the candidate appointed at the start of perlod t: 
{32a} 
Then, by using (31a) and (31b), express ion (32a) can be rewritten as (32a') 
(32a' ) 
Similarly, we obtain the utility that at the beginning of period t-l the out-
of-power party j expects to obtain in period t from the candidate appointed at 
the start of period t: 
(32b) 
By using (31a) and (31b), and since u(Y~\, t. 
can be rewritten as 
(32b' ) 
- u(~)j,t., express ion (32b) 
Assume now that at the beginning af periad t-l a vacancy arises in the seat 
considered aboye (the ane whose term expires at the end of period t). As a 
result, s = 2. Moreaver, assume that neither t-l nor t are electoral periads. 
Since we are not considering elections, parties k and j at perlad tare the 
same that parties k and j at period t-l. 
If party j has veto right in periad t-l, acceptable periad t-l candidates 
(Yt.-l = Y~-l) must satisfy: 
(33a) 
That is, 
(33b) 
(33c) 
E {I" a' t.-l Li"'l 
Substituting expression (32a') into {33b} and (32b') into (33c) yields: 
12 
• 
(34a) 
(34b) 
If party j has no veto right in period t-l, acceptable period t-l candidates 
(Yt-l = ~-1) must satisfy: 
(35a) 
That is, 
(35b) 
As a result, expected discounted utility for party j will be: 
(35c) 
The utility that at the beginning of periad t-2 the nominating party k expects 
to obtain in periods t-l and t from the candidate appointed at the start of 
period t-l is given by: 
(36a) Et_Z{ u(Yt.-l)k,t.-l + <5u(Yt _1 )k,t } = 
O-H)Et _z{ U(~-l)k,t-l + <5U{Y~_l)k,t } + HEt_z{ U(Y~-l)k,t_l + (5U(Y~_l)k,t } 
By making use of the law of iterated expectations we can 
expectation operator in expressions (35b) and (34a). Then, 
two new expressions into (36a) yields: 
(36b) Et_2{ u(Yt-1)k,t-l + (5u(Yt _1)k,t } <!:: 
lag one period the 
suhstituting these 
O-H)(5(1-H)Et _z{ U(Y~)k,t } + H<5(l-H)Et _z{ U{~)k,t } 
Rearranging the right-hand-side of this express ion yields 
13 
(36c) 
Similarly, the expected discounted utility that party j obtains ln periods t-1 
and t from such a candidate 15 given by: 
(36d) 
Now assume that at the beglnning of period t-2 a vacancy arises in the seat 
whose term expires at the end of period t. Thus s "" 3. Assume further that 
t-2, t-1, and tare not electoral periods. 
If party j has veto right at the start of periad t-2, acceptable periad t-2 
candldates (Yt-z = Y~-z) must satisfy: 
(37a) Et._z{ L~",o oi u(Y~-z)z,t-Z+i } = Et_z{ L==l 01 u(Yt-1)z,t-Z+1 }, Z = 0,1 
That ls, 
(37b) 
(37c) 
Et_Z{ U(Y~-2)k,t-2 + OU(Y~_2)k,t_l + o2U(Y:_2)k,t } 
OEt_2{ u(Yt-1)k,t-l + oU(Yt _1 )k,t } 
Et_2{ U(Y~_2)j.t_2 + OU(Y:_2)j,t_l + o2U(Y~_2)j,t } 
OEt_2{ u(Yt_1)j,t_l + oU(Yt_t)j,t } 
Substituting (36c) into (37b) and (36d) into (37c) yields: 
(37d) 
(37e) 
Et_2{ U(Y~-2)k.t-2 + OU(Y~_2)k,t_l + o2u(Y~_2)k,t 
02C1-HJEt_2{ U(~)k,t } 
If party j has no veto right at the start of periad t-2, acceptab!e period t-2 
candidates (Yt-2 = Y~_2J must satisfy: 
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(38a) 
Substituting (36c) into (38a) we have 
(38b) Et_2{ U(~_2)k,t_2 + OUO'~_2)k,t_1 + o2u(Y~_21k,t } 2:. 
(52(1-H1Et _2{ U(~)k,t } 
Repeatlng these sequences until period t-q (where q < n), we can find the 
conditions that acceptable perlad t-q candidates must satisfy. 
If party j has veto right at the start of periad t-q (where n > q > 1), these 
conditioos read: 
(39a) 
(39b) 
However, if q=1 these canditlons read: 
(39c) 
(39d) 
Moreaver, if q O, the cooditians can be rewritten as: 
(3ge) u(Y~)z, t o 
Ir party j has no veto power at the start of perlad t-q (where n > q > O), the 
conditlan reads: 
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(40a) 
For q O, the condition becomes: 
(40b) 
Moreover, Vq it happens that 
(411 E;_q{ );.0 .' u(Y~_q),,;_q., } < E;_q{ );.0 o' u(Y~_q)k,;_q., } 
Expression (41) indicates that if at the time a vacancy arises -whose term 
does not overlap an election- the out-of-power party has no veto right, the 
then directly appointed governor will be more partisan than the nominee would 
be in the case veto power does existo The reason being that the nominating 
party k will obtain more expected utility from a direct1y appointed governor 
than from a candidate that should be confirmed by the out-of-power party. 
Expressions (39c) , (39d) , and (40a) show that the type of central bank 
governors depends on the discount factor, o, the unexpired portion of the 
term, q, the probability that the 10sing party has veto right, H, and the 
expected utility the nominating party would obtain from a type yN central 
banker appointed to serve out the last period of the termo Such an expected 
uti1ity depends, in turn, on the expected incumbent board composition at the 
start of the last period of the termo 
In particular, the acceptable central banker appointed in period t-q to se:ve 
out the unexpired portion of a term that expires at the end of period t wl1l 
be more partisan (in the sense that his type will be closer to his nominating 
party's bliss point): 
(i) the more patient parties are (that is, the higher o). 
If o grows, the nominating party k gives greater importance to future 
utilities obtained from an appointed governor. Since there exists a positive 
probability that party k will appoint directly a governor in the fu:-ure and 
such a governor would generate more utility for party k due to the hlgher o, 
then for a candidate to be nominated today he must be more partisan, Consider 
expression (39a) and rewrite it as 
(39a' ) 
If 8 rises, the 81-q terms decline, so that the u(Y~-q)k,t-q+i terms must rise 
for the weak inequality to hold. As a result, appointments will be more 
partisano 
(H) the shorter the unexpired portion of the term the candidate must serve 
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i 
out (that is, the lower q)2. 
If. q. decreases, the nominating party has less periods remainin'g, to,-'extract 
utlllty from a current appointment, so that the appointed governor must be 
more partisano Observe that if q de creases there are fewer U(~~_q)~ t-q+i 
terms in the left-hand-side of expression (39a') so that these terms must be 
higher for the weak inequality to hold. Then, appointments will be more 
partisano 
(iii) .the lower the probability of the out-of-power party j having veto power. 
If H lS lower, the right-hand-side of (39a') rises and the left-hand-side must 
also rise for the inequality to hold. Therefore, appointments will be more 
~ar:-isan. If H decreases, there ls more chance for future periods where party 
J wlll not have veto power, so that it will pay more for party k to wait for 
such periods to directly appoint a governor. Therefore, a cUrrent acceptable 
candidate must be more partisan to compensate party k for not waiting until 
future periods. 
(iv) the higher the expected utility party k would obtain if it could directly 
appoint a governor the last period of the termo If wai ting for a more 
appropiate candidate pays more to party k, then a current acceptable candidate 
must pay more to offset this fact. Therefore, he must be more partisano 
Observe that if the probability of party j having veto power is H = 1, then 
the results in this subsection collapse to the results in the previous 
section. This is related to point (iii) aboye: as H tends to unity, 
appointments will be more modera te. 
4.2. Appointments for terms that overlap e1ections 
Frequent1y, t~e term a governor must serve out overlaps one or more elections. 
Thus •. we are lnterested in exploring (i) how such an overlapping and (ii) how 
the dlstance from the next election affect the appointment of governors to the 
central bank board. 
In this subsection we extend the analysis in the previous subsection and 
develop two examples in arder to answer the questions aboYe. 
Now, we consider appointments for either an entire term or for the unexpired 
portian of a term which overlap electl0ns. In such clrcumstances, the roles of 
parties as governmental party and opposi tion party may change after the 
election. 
Therefore, we will need to change notation slightly. Thus, let k(t+i) denote 
the nomi?ating party ~~ time t+i and j(t+iJ denote the confirming party at 
tim~ t+:. Thus, k(t.+l) = j(t+iJ if the opposition party controls the 
legls1atlve body at tlme t+i and k(t+i) * j(t+i) if the opposition party does 
not control the legislative body at time t+i. 
Similarl~, let. u(Y t)k(tl ,l+i denote the uti li ty the period t nominating party 
obtains ln perlad t+i from an acceptable candidate appointed at the start of 
period t. Similarly, let u(Yt)J(ll,t+i denote the utility the period t 
confirming party obtains from an acceptable candidate appointed at the 
2Except for q=O and veto right, in which case the candidate is the most 
moderate because his type is similar to the median incumbent member's. 
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beginning of period t. 
In the case the out-of-power party has veto right in period t, acceptable 
period t candidates (Yt = Y~) must satisfy tbe following condition 
(42a) 
In the case there ls no veto power in period t, tbe condition for acceptable 
period t candidates (Yt = Y~) reads: 
(42b) Et{ L:~ ó1 U(r;:)k(tl,t+i } 2: Et{ L:~ ó i U(Yt+l)k(tl,t+i } 
Assume that at tbe start of period t a vacancy arises in a seat wbose term 
expires at tbe end of period t. At tbe time tbe vacancy arises an election 
takes place and the victor of tbis election (party k(t)) can nominate a 
candidate to fi11 the vacancy. Ibe losing party, jet), may or may not have a 
say in the selection process. 
Suppose party jet) has veto power. The conditions for an acceptable candidate 
(Yt = Y~) are 
(43a) u(Y~)Z(t), t = O 
If party jet) bas no veto power, then the condition for an acceptable 
candidate (Yt = ~) ls 
(43b) 
It ls clear tbat expressions (43a) and (31a) coincide. Ihe same result applies 
for expressions (43b) and (31h). Ihe reason being tbat -since the central 
banker appointed in period t to serve out this period is nomlnated and, where 
necessary, confirmed after the election- tbe portion of the term this central 
banker serves out does not overlap the election. 
However, because of the existence of an election at the start of perlod t, tbe 
utilities tbat parties expect at the beginning of period t-l to obtain from 
the candidate appointed in period t should change. These utilltles are now: 
, 
(44a) Et_l{ U(Y~kCt-ll,t } = PEt_l{ ueYt)kltl,t } + (1-P1Et _1{ u(Yt)JCtl,t } 
Substi tutlng 
yields 
(44b) 
(32a' 1 and (3Zb') into the right-hand-side of equation (44a) 
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because tbe probability of party k(t-l) being k(t) is P and being jCt) is l-P. 
Similarly, 
e44c) (ZP-l )(1-H1Et _1{ U{Y~\ltl, t } 
In order to simplify notations, define Q : U(~)k(tl,t. 
Assume that a vacancy arises now at the start of period t-l in the seat whose 
term expires at the end of period t. Moreover, keep on assuming that an 
election takes place at the start of period t. 
Lagging expressions (42a) and (42b) one perlod we can obtain the conditions 
for an acceptable period t-l candidate if in such a period the out-of-power 
party j(t-l) has veto right: 
(450) Et_l{ U(Y~-l)k(t-l), t-l + ÓU(Y~-l)klt_ll, t } ÓEt_l{ u(Yt )kCt-ll,t } 
(45b) Et_l{ U(Y~_l )klt-ll ,t-l + ÓU(Y~-l)klt-ll,t } = ÓEt_l{ u(Yt ) j(t-l) , t } 
Substituting (44b) and (44c) into (45a) and (45b) yields 
(46a) Et_l{ U(Y~_1 )kCt-ll, t-1 + ÓU(Y~_l )kCt-l 1, t } o(2P-l)(1-H)Et_l{Q}~ O 
(46b) Et_l{ U(Y~-1)J(t-1l,t-l + ÓU(Y~_l) J (t-11, t } - ó(ZP-l)(l-H)Et_l{Q}~ O 
since (2P - 1) can be positive, negative or zero for P>1/2, P<l/Z, and P=1/2, 
respectively. 
Suppose now that party j(t-l) has no veto power. Ihen, the condition for an 
acceptable period t-l central banker is 
Therefore, if the term a central banker must serve out overlaps tbe next 
election, the nominating party may even obtain an expected disutility from his 
appointment. Ihis is the case if the probability of tbis party winning the 
next election is lower than l/Z. In fact, express ion (46a) sbows that if P<1/2 
and party j(t-l) has veto power, party k(t-l) accepts to experiment an 
expected disutility when it nominates a candidate. 
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We can check now how the pattern oí appointments to the central bank differ 
for terms which overlap elections and for terms which do not overlap 
elections. To do so we compare expressions (34a) and (46a) and expressions 
(34b) and (46b). We can write: 
(47) 
(48) 
Et_l{ U(Y~-l)k(t-ll, t-l + OU(Y~_l )k(t-1l, t } 
(2P-1) 'Et_l{ U(Y~-l)k,t-l + OU(Y~_l)k,t } 
Et_l{ U(Y~-l)j(t-l),t-l + OU(Y~_1)j(t_1J,t } "" 
(2P-1) • Et_l{ u (Y~-l) j, t-l + óU eY~_l) j, t } 
If O < P < 1 and O < H < 1, we find that (34a) > (46a) and (34b) < (46b) 
because (ZP - 1)< 1, VP. 
As a result, nominated and confirmed central bankers will tend to be more 
moderate if their terms overlap elections. The reason being that the 
governmental (and nominating) party has less bargaining power and the 
opposition party has more bargaining power if there exists a chance that 
parties change roles because of an election during the term the candidate must 
serve out. 
The same conclusion arises from cornparing expressions (35b) and (46c), so that 
directly appointed central bankers will tend to be more moderate if their 
terms overlap elections. 
It can be seen that appointed governors to serve out terms that overlap 
elections will be more partisan the higher the probability the nominating 
party at the time the vacancy occurs will win the next election (P). The 
reason is clear: the higher P the less likely that parties change roles 
because of the election. 
Now, we are interested in the pattern of appointments to the central bank as 
the next election approaches. In particular, consider two governors appointed 
to serve out two terms consisting of the same number of periods. Moreover, 
assume that the next election is closer to the time one governor is appointed 
than to the time ~1he other governor is appointed. We want to know if there 
exists a differenc, between these two governors' type. 
:;J. 
To analyze this pa1tern we will consider an example including the appointment 
of two central bankers to serve out s = 3 periods remaining at the start of 
period t-Z (that is, the three periods remaining are periods t-Z, t-l, and t). 
We will consider the proximity of an election in the following way. Suppose 
that when the first central banker is appointed, the electlon wlll be held at 
the start oí perlod t (so that there are two periods to go p,or the next 
election). Moreover, suppose that when the second central banker ls appointed, 
the election wilI be held at the start of period t-1 (so that there is just 
one period to go for the next election). ~ 
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Since the vacancies arise at the start of period t-Z, express ion (42b) for t-Z 
provides the condition for an acceptable period t-Z candidate ií party J{t-Z) 
does not have veto power: 
(49) Et_2{ UO{_2)k(t_ZJ,t_2 + ÓUO~_2)k{t_2),t_l + ó2U(~_2)k(t_2),t } 2; 
OEt_2{ u{Yt - 1 )k(t-Zl,t-l + oU(Yt-1)k(t-ZJ,t } 
We know that 
(50) Et_2{ U{Yt-l)klt-2J,t-l + oueYt _1 )k(t_ZJ,t } = 
(1-H)Et _2{ U(~-l)k(t-1),t-l + OUO'~_l)k(t_1),t } + 
HEt_2{ U(Y~_1)k(t_1J,t_l + OU(Y~_l)k(t_l),t } 
since -as the election will be held at the start of period t- party k(t-l) and 
party k(t-Z) coincide. 
Using the law of iterated expectations in expressions (46a) and (46c) and 
inserting them in equation (50) we obtain: 
(51) 
Using (51) ioto (50) yields 
+ óUO{_a)k1t_Zl,t_l + a2u(~_2)k{t_2),t }?: 
ó2 (ZP-l) (1-H)Et _2{Q} 
Suppose now that party j(t-2) does have veto power. Therefore, using (4Za) for 
t-2 provides the conditions for an acceptable periad t-2 candidate: 
Since 
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(54al Et_2{ u(Yt - t l k (t_:2J,t_l + ÓU(Yt _1 )k(t-:2J, t } ~ 5(1-H) (2P-1 lEt _:2{Q} 
(54b) Et_2{ U(Yt _1 ) j (t-2J, t-l + óU(Yt _t ) j(t-2J ,t } , - ó(1-H){ZP-1)Et _2W} 
using (54a) and (54b) in the right-hand-side of (53), we obtain: 
(55a) Et_2{ U(Y~-2)k(t-2J,t-2 + OU(Y~-2)k(t-2J,t-l + ó2U(Y~_2)k{t_2l,t } ~ 
o2( 1-H) (ZP-1 lEt _2{Q} 
(55b) Et_2{ U(Y~-2)j{t-2),t-2 + ÓU(Y~_2)j(t_2l,t_l + ó2u(yi_2)j{t_2l,t }.:;; 
- ó2 (1-H)(2P-1)Et _2HH 
Now, we analyze the case for an appointment at the start of period t-Z for 8=3 
remaining periods with the election being held at the start of period t-1. 
In this case, party k(t-l) and party kit) coincide. Therefore: 
First of all, assume that a vacancy arises at the start of period t-l whose 
term expires at the end of perlod t and that party j(t-1) has veto power, 
Ihen. 
(57a) E,_,{ v u(Yt _t )k(t-ll. t-l + ÓU(Yi_l )k(t-ll, t }= 3Et_l{ U(Yt)k(t-ll,t } 
(57b) Et_l{ u (Y~-l) j (t-ll ,t-l + ÓU(yi_l) j (t-1). t } OEt_t{ u(Yt)j(t_ll,t } 
Using (56) into (57a) and (57b) we have 
(58a) Et_l{ UC}i_l )k{t-ll, t-l + ou(yi-t)klt-l),t } o(1-H)Et _1 {Q} 
" (58b) { '1 Et_l uhi_t) j (t-ll , t-l + ÓU(Y~_l 1 J (t-l), t } - o (1-H1Et _t {Q} 
Suppose now that party j(t-1) has not veto power. Then, the conditions for an 
acceptable period t-1 candidate are: 
(59) o (1-H1Et _1 {Q} 
] 
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Assume now that at the start of period t-2 a vacancy arises in a seat whose 
term expires at the end of period t. Moreover, at the start of period t-1 
there ls an election. Then, since there ls a probability P that party k(t-2) 
and party k{t-1) coincide, we can write: 
(60) Et_2{ u(Yt-th(t-2J,t-l + oU(Yt - t )kit-2l,t } 
PE<-<{ u{Y t-l )klt-t J • t-l + 3U(Yt_l lk(t-ll, t } -
(1-P1Et _2{ u(Y t-l)k (t-ll ,t-l + 3u(Yt _t )k(t_ll,t } 
(2P-UEt _2{ u{Yt - 1 )k(t-ll ,t-l + OU(Yt-l)k(t-lJ,t } 
Now, since there exists a prohability H that party j(t-l) has veto power. we 
can write: 
(61) Et_2{ u(Yt-tlkit:-ll,t-l + 3u(Yt _t )k{t_1l ,t } 
HEt_2{ U(yi-l)k(t-ll,t-l + 5u(yi_lh¡t_ll,t } + 
O-H1Et _2{ U(~_l )k(t-ll, t-l + oU{Y~_t)k(t_ll,t } 
Using (S8a) and (59) in (61), we have 
Therefore, using (62) into (60) we obtain 
(63) Et_2{ u(Yt - t )k(t-2l,t-l + óU(Yt - 1 )k(t-2l,t } ~ ó{1-H)(2P-1)Et _2 HH 
Now, we can obtain the conditions for an acceptable period t-2 candidate if in 
such a periad the out-of-power party j(t-2) has veto right: 
(64) Et_2{ U(Y~_2)Z(t_2). t-2 + OU(Y~_2)Z(t_2) ,t-1 + ó2.U(Y~_2)Z{t_2, t } = 
OEt_2{ U(Yt-l)z(t-2),t-l + 3U(Yt _1 )Z(t_2.),t}, z(t-2) 0,1 
Since by (63) we al so know that 
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(65) 
using (63) and (65) in the right-hand-side of (64), we obtain: 
(66a) 
(66b) 
Et_Z{ U(Y~-2)k(t-2), t-2 + OU(yi_2)k(l_2J, t-l + ,s2u {yi_z)kCt_2, t 
5 2 (1-H) (2P-l )Et_z{Q} 
Et_Z{ u(yi-Z)j(t-21,t-z + 
The condition for an acceptable perlad t-2 candidate if in 8uch a perlad the 
out-of-power party j(t-2) has not veto right 18: 
(67) EH{ U(~-2)k(l-2), t-2 + ÓU(~_2)k(t_2), t-l + o2U(~_2)k(t_2.t } > 
OEt_z{ u(Yt-l)k{t-21,t-l + OU(Yt_l)k(t_21,t } 
Using (63) we can write: 
(68) Et_z{ U(Y~-2)k(t-21, t-2 + ÓU(~_2)k(t_2). t-l + o2UO'~_2)k(t_2, t } ~ 
52 (1-H) (2P-1)Et _2{Q) 
The conditions for an acceptable perlad t-2 central banker if party j(t-Z) has 
veto right are given by express ion (52) if the election ls held at the start 
of perlad t and by expression (68) if the election is held at the beginning of 
period t-l. It can be seen that these expressions do not coincide. 
Ihe conditions for an acceptable period t-2 central banker if party j(t-2) has 
not veto power are given by expressions (SSa) and (S5b) if the election is 
held at the start of period t and by expressions (66a) and (66b) if the 
election is held at the beginning of period t-l. Now again the expressions do 
not coincide. , 
.:1 In particular, w:$ can rewrlte the condition for an acceptable period t-2 
central banker who must serve out three periods if the election is held at the 
beginning of period t as: 
(69) Et_2{ L=o 51 U(Yt_2)k(t_2),t_2+1 } ~ 5 2 (1-H) (2P-1)Et _2{Q} 
Such a condition for the election being held at the start of period t-l can be 
rewritten as: 
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(70) Et_2{ L~=o 5 i U(Yt-2)k(t-2J,t-2+i } { o2(1-H)(2P-1)Et~2{Q} 
Accordingly, the utility that the period t-2 nominating party expects to 
obtain from an acceptable candidate during the three following periods is 
higher for the election being held at the beginning of period t than for the 
e1ection being held at the start of period t-l. In other words, we have found 
that a governor appointed to serve three periods of time will be more partisan 
the more distant the next election. Iherefore, from this example we can 
conclude that the proximity of e1ections have effects on the type of central 
bankers appointed. That is, as the next e1ection approaches, appointed 
governors will tend to be more moderate provided the remaining term they must 
serve out consists of the same number of periods. 
Ihe intuition behind this result follows from the fact that if the out-of-
power party has a majorlty in the legislative bOdy, it has an incentive to 
reject partisan nominations to the board, This incentive to hold out is 
stronger as the next election is closer because the term the appointee must 
serve out will include a higher number of periods after the election. This 
ranks as a longer time horizon for which the current out-of-power party could 
be the nominating party. Ihen, the current out-of-power party has greater 
bargaining power the les s distant the next election and, therefore, the more 
moderate the currently appointed central banker. 
5. Discussion 
Our analysis suggests that the higher the probability of the out-of-power 
party having veto power the more rooderate the appointed governors. Moreover, 
if at the time a vacancy arises the opposi tion party does not control the 
legislative body, the appointed governor will be more partisan than the 
nominee would be in the case veto power does existo 
Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) have found empirical evidence supporting this 
type of results for the U.S, case. By using probit analysis, they find that 
partisan governors (economists3) are much less likely to be appointed when the 
Senate and the Presidency are contr011ed by opposing parties. They estimated a 
probit regression which used as dependent variable appointees who were 
economists and as explanatory variables the number of months into the 
Presidential term, a variable measuring if the Senate was controlled or not by 
the opposition party and a measure of the partisan composition of the board. 
The coefficients for the President' s months in office and Senate control 
variables had negative signs and were significant at the conventional five 
percent level. 
The result for the Senate control variable supports the views that the 
3 Havrilesky and Gildea examine the voting records of Fed governors when split 
voting occurred and divide the governors into two groups: reliable and 
unreliable governors. Reliable governors are those who tend to vote por 
monetary policies preferred by the party that appointed them, Unreliable 
governors are those who have no we11-defined tendency to vote the party line 
or tend to vote for the opposition monetary policy, By regressing reliability 
against career characteristics, they find that reliable governors tend to be 
economists, especially Ph. D. academic economists. 
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existence of veto right at the Senate causes moderate appointments. 
The result for the President's months in office variable indicates that as the 
next election approaches appointments are less partisano This empirical result 
is consistent with our theoretical finding, derived in subsection 4.2. aboye. 
Moreover, from expressions (69) and (70) it can he seen that irrespective of 
the probability of the opposition party controlling the legislative hody 
(except for H=l), the closer the next election the more moderate the 
appointments. Again, this finding is consistent with resul ts provided by 
Havrilesky and Gildea (1992). They split the sample into two subsets, 
governors appointed when the Senate is controlled by the opposition and 
governors appointed when it was not and probit regressions were estimated from 
both subsamples. The months-in-office coefficients were negative, of similar 
magnitude, and significant at the ten percent level in both cases, implying 
that appointments tend to be more moderate as the next election approaches 
irrespective of the opposition controlling the Senate. 
Since we have found that central bankers will be more moderate if their terms 
overlap elections, an immediate result of our analysis is that if aterro 
exists which runs concurrently wi th the adrninistration' s and thU5 provides i t 
with its first opportunity to appoint a central banker to the board, this term 
will be filled by a central banker more partisan than in the case the term 
were not concurrent with administration' s. Therefore, i t 5eems that the 26 
Congressional bills over the period 1979-1990 (Akhtar and Howe, 1991) which 
intented to change the term structure of the board such that the chairman and 
vice chairman's (essentially) terms run concurrentIy with the President rather 
than precede it by one year would lead to the appointment of a chairman more 
partisan, in the sense that his type would be closer to his nominating party's 
bliss point. 
6. Sununary 
In this paper, a formal model has been developed to analyze the appointment of 
individuals to serve as central bank governors in a two-party political system 
when confirmation hearlngs exists and monetary policy ls determined according 
to a majority-rule voting system within the central bank board of governors. 
The major resul ts of the paper are that appointed governors will tend to be 
more moderate (1) if the nominating party and the confirming party do not 
coincide at present, (U) the lower the chance the nominating party and the 
confirming party coincide in the future, (HU if the term governors must 
serve out overIaps an election, (iv) as the next election approaches, and (v) 
the lower the probability the nominating party wins the next election. 
Moreover, sorne of 
evidence related t,p 
!s 
these results are consistent with existing empirical 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
26 
References 
Akhtar, M.A. and Howard Howe (1991). "The Political and Instltutional 
Independence of U.S. Monetary Policy", Banca Nazionale del Lavara Quarterly 
Review, 178, pp. 343-389. 
Chappell, Henry, Thomas Havrilesky and Rob McGregor (1993). "Partisan Monetary 
Policies; Presidential Influence through the Power of Appointment", Quarterly 
Journal of Eeonomies, 108, pp. 185-218. 
Cothren, Richard (1988). "Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy 
Committee", Quarterly Journal of Eeonomies, 103, pp. 429-434. 
Garcia de Paso, José 1. (1993). "Central Bank Structure and Monetary Policy 
Uncertainty". Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, working paper no. 
9314. 
Gildea, Jolm (1990). "Explaining FOMC Members' Votes" in T. Mayer, ed., The 
Political Economy of American Nonetary Polley, Cambridge University Press. 
Havrilesky, Thomas (1988). "Monetary Signalling from the Administration to the 
Federal Reserve". Journal of Honey, Credit, and Banking, 20, pp. 83-101. 
Havrilesky, Thomas (1991). The Frequency of Monetary Policy Signalling from 
the Administration to the Federal Reserve", Journal of Money, Gredit, and 
Banking, 23, pp. 423-428. 
Havrilesky, Thomas and Robert Schweltzer (1990). "A Theory of FOMC Dissent 
Voting with Evidence from the Time Series" in T. Mayer, ed .• The Political 
Economy of American l10netary Poliey, Cambridge University Press. 
Havrilesky, Thomas and John Gildea (1992). "Reliable and Unreliable Partisan 
Appointees to the Board of Governors", Public Choice, 73, pp. 397-417. 
Waller, Christopher J. (1991). "The Politics of Monetary Policy: A Game Theory 
Model of Coercion and Bashing by the Administration", Economic Inquiry, 24, 
pp. 1-13. 
Waller, Christopher J. (1992). "A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to 
the Central Bank", Journal of Monetary Economics, 29, pp. 411-428. 
27 
SERIE DE DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO DEL ¡CAE 
9301 "Análisis del comportamiento de las cotizaciones reales en la Bolsa 
de Madrid bajo la hipótesis de eficiencia". Rafael Flores de 
Frutos. Diciembre 1992. (Aceptado para publicar en Estadística Española) 
9302 "Sobre la estimación de primas por plazo dentro de la estructura 
temporal de tipos de interés". Rafael Flores de Frutos. Diciembre 
1992. 
9303 "Cambios de estructuras de gasto y de consumo en el cálculo del 
¡pe", Antonio Abadía. Febrero 1993. (PubJicado en Reyista de Economía 
Aplicada, VoLl, N°!) 
9304 "Tax Analysis in a Limit Pricing Model". Félix Marcos. Febrero 
1993. 
9305 "El tipo de cambio propio: reformulación del concepto y 
estimación para el caso español". José de Hevia Payá. Junio 1993. 
(Publicado en Revista Española de Econonúa, Vol.II, N°!, 1994) 
9306 "Price Volatility Under Altemative Monetary Instruments". Alfonso 
Novales. Abril 1992. 
9307 "Teorías del tipo de cambio: una panorámica". Osear Bajo Rubio 
y Simón Sosvilla Rivera. Junio1993. (Publicado en Reyista de Economía 
Aplicada, VaLl, N°2). 
9308 "Testing Theories of Economic Fluctuations and Growth in Early 
Development (The Case of the Chesapeake Tobacco Economy) ". 
Rafael Flores de Frutos y Alfredo M. Pereira. Diciembre 1992. 
9309 
9310 
9311 
9312 
9313 
9314 
9315 
9316 
9317 
"Maastricht Convergence Conditions: A Lower Bound for 
Inflation?". Jorge Blázquez y Miguel Sebastiáu. Marzo 1992. 
"Recursive Identification, Estimation and Forecasting of 
Nonstationary Economic Time Series with Applications to GNP 
International Data". A. García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A. Novales y 
P.C. Young. Marzo 1993. (De próxima aparición en un volumen de homenaje 
a A. ZeIlner) 
"General Dynamics in Overlapping Generations Models ". Carmen 
Carrera y Manuel Morán. Enero 1993. (Aceptado para publicar en JournaL 
oí Economic Dynamics and Control) 
"Further Evidence on Forecasting International GNP Growth Rafes 
Using Unobserved Components Transfer Function Models". A. 
García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A. Novales y P.C. Young. Septiembre 
1993. 
"Public Capital and Aggregate Growth in the United States: Is 
Public Capital Productive?". Rafael Flores de Frutos y Alfredo M. 
Pereira. Julio 1993. 
"Central Bank Structure and Monetary Policy Uncertainty". José 
L García de Paso. Abril 1993. 
"Monftary Policy with Private Information: A Role for Monetary 
Targllts". José L García de Paso. Julio 1993. 
~ 
"Exact Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Stationary Vector ARMA 
Models". José Alberto Mauricio. Julio 1993. (Aceptado para publicar en 
Journal oí the American Statistical Association) 
"The Exact Likelihood Function of a Vector ARMA Model". José 
Alberto Mauricio. Julio 1993. I 
r 
1 
9318 
9401 
9402 
9403 
9404 
9405 
9406 
9407 
9408 
"Business Telephone Traffic Demand in Spain: 1980-1991, An 
Econometric Approach". Teodosio Pérez Amaral, Francisco 
Alvarez González y Bernardo Moreno Jiménez. Septiembre 1993. 
(Aceptado para publicación en Infonnation Economics and Policy) 
"Contrastes de momentos y de la matriz de información". Teodosio 
Pérez Amaral. Junio 1994. (Publicado en Cuadernos Económicos del ICE N° 
55, 1993/3) , 
"A Partisan Explanation of Political Monetary Cycles ". José l. 
García de Paso. Junio 1994. 
l/Estadísticos para la detección de observaciones anómalas en 
modelos de elección binaria: una aplicación con datos reales". 
Gregario R. Serrano. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para publicar en Estadística 
Española) 
"Effects of Public lnvestment in lnfraestructure on the Spanish 
Economy". Rafael Flores de Frutos, Mercedes Gracia Díez y 
Teodosio Pérez Amaral. Junio 1994. 
11 Observaciones anómalas en modelos de elección binaria". 
Mercedes Gracia y Gregorio R. Serrano. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para 
publicar en Estadística Española) 
"Permanent Components in Seasonal Variables". Rafael Flores y 
Alfonso Novales. Junio 1994. 
"Money Demand lnstability and the Performance of the Monetary 
Model of Exchonge Rates". Rodrigo Peruga. Junio 1994. 
"Una nota sobre la estimación eficiente de modelos con parámetros 
cambiantes". Sonia Sotoca. Junio 1994. 
í 
9409 "Distribución de la renta y redistribución a través del IRPF en 
España". Rafael Salas. Junio 1994. 
9410 "Trade Balances: Do Exchange Rates Matter?". Rodrigo Peruga. 
Junio 1994. 
9411 "A Retrial System with Constant Attempts". Mercedes Vázquez. 
Octubre 1994. 
9412 "A Retrial Model at Nonstationary Regime". Mercedes Váquez. 
Octubre 1994. 
9413 "Equívocos y singularidades en el sistema financiero español". 
Jaime Terceiro Lomba. Noviembre 1994. 
9414 "On Univariate Forecasting Comparisons: The Case ofthe Spanish 
Automobile Industry". A.García-Ferrer, J. del Hoyo, A.S. Martín-
Arroyo y P.C. Young. Junio 1994. (Aceptado para publicar en Journal of 
Forecasting) 
9415 "Horizontal and Vertical Inequality in a Social Welfare 
Framework". Rafael Salas. Noviembre 1994. 
9416 "A Model of Appointing Governors to the Central Bank". José 1. 
Garda de Paso. Octubre 1994. 
i 
9417 "Ca¡lital público y restricción presupuestaria gubernamental". 
Jorge Blázquez y Miguel Sebastián. Diciembre 1994. 
9418 "Efectos dinámicos de perturbaciones de demanda y oferta en la 
economía española". Esther Fernández Casillas, José Luis 
Fernández Serrano, Baltasar Manzano Gonz41ez y Jesús Ruiz 
Andújar. Diciembre 1994. 
